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Participants and researchers searching for meaning: 
Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the experience of pain 
Jonathan A Smith 
 
In this paper, I describe an extended theoretical positioning for IPA’s inherent concern with 
meaning-making on the part of both participant and researcher. It arises from thinking I 
have done as part of giving a set of keynote presentations in 2017-18 (in London, UK; 
Florida, USA; Poitiers, Francei). The paper presents a composite of the ideas outlined in the 
keynotes and stays close to the oral voice of the talks. I am grateful to the conference 
organizers for inviting me and so helping me to develop this piece. In it, I draw on a range of 
writings on meaning and use them to elaborate on what is meant by IPA’s concern with the 
search for meaning. In order to illustrate how this works in practice, I then take some 
examples from studies I have conducted on the experience of pain and link the theoretical 
ideas to the studies’ findings. 
 
Participants searching for meaning 
 
While IPA can be applied to a wide range of issues, it comes into its own when examining 
people’s perceptions of major experiences that are happening to them and which engage 
hot cognition. It is in these circumstances in particular that the participant is forced to 
reflect on what has happened and attempts to make sense of its meaning. As a 
consequence, the event engenders a lot of cerebral activity and that cognition is 
emotionally laden.  
 
Such experiences can either be relatively current and discrete, for example a major decision 
or major turning point in somebody’s life, or it can be ongoing. What makes an ongoing 
situation apposite for IPA is the presence of the hot cognition. So while somebody may have 
had a chronic illness for a number of years, it may still be something they are wrestling with. 
They’re still doing a lot of cerebral and emotional activity about it as they attempt to find 
the meaning in what has happened. 
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Inherent to this model is the notion of a person as intrinsically a self-reflexive, sense making 
agent who is interpreting their engagement with the world. Social philosopher, Charles 
Taylor, describes us as self-interpreting animals (Taylor 1985a, p45). Being human involves 
endeavoring to find meaning in what’s happening to us. IPA’s position also echoes the 
hermeneutic psychology of Martin and Sugarman (2001):  
 
Events as experienced by human agents carry significance. They matter, and humans 
are consequently not indifferent to, but interactive with, them. (p193) 
 
Indeed what turns an event into an experience is the significance bestowed on it by the 
human participating in, and potentially changed by, what is happening. 
 
Thus human beings are sense making creatures and that sense making is reflected in the 
meaning of what is being made sense of. Let’s think a little more about what we mean by 
meaning. In Box 1, I offer a typology of levels of meaning. I’m not reifying this, this is just 
suggestive, but I think it’s quite helpful in terms of thinking about the centre of gravity for 
an IPA study. 
 
                                                                                                                    
   Type of question                                      Level of Analysis                 Density of IPA focus 
1. What does that mean?        Literal                  I 
2. What does he mean?          Pragmatic/textual (puzzle)  III 
3. What does it mean?         Experiential (significance)    IIIII  
4. What does it mean for my identity?    Existential (significance)    III  
5. What does my life mean?                      Existential (purpose)              II 
 
                                             Box 1: A typology of meaning 
 
The typology is established by the type of question a person might ask; this reflects the level 
of sense making they are engaged in. So in terms of this series of levels of searching for 
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meaning, we can start with the literal. At that first level, when someone asks ‘what does 
that mean?’ they are seeking a literal answer; ‘what is the linguistic definition of the word 
being considered?’ That’s in a sense the most basic level of a search for meaning.  
 
The second level of searching for meaning, that we as humans are almost always concerned 
with, is the more pragmatic question of what does a piece of text or an utterance actually 
mean. So if we’re reading a text, it’s not just about what the literal meaning of the text is 
but rather ‘what does it actually mean?’ And that involves a textual puzzling with, or 
unravelling of, what’s going on. ‘What does this poem mean?’ Or more pragmatically, ‘what 
did he mean when he said that in our conversation’?  
 
The third level is the more experiential one. This is concerned with the meaning of major 
things happening in one’s life. ‘What does it mean that I’ve been told I have a positive 
diagnosis for a serious illness? What does it mean to me that I have been offered a 
promotion at work?’  So the third level is concerned with the experiential significance of the 
thing that’s happening. And indeed that’s the centre of gravity for IPA. It is the type of quest 
after meaning that is almost always present in an IPA study. 
 
The next level becomes existential. ‘Well, what does this mean for my identity?’ So it’s an 
experience that’s got more resonance, it’s got some meaning for my identity, for who I am.  
 
And, finally, meaning at the highest level in the typology is of heightened existential import 
where the question may become one of life purpose: ‘what does my life mean anyway?’ or 
‘does my life have any meaning?’ 
 
This typology is one which reflects my own sense of the different ways in which we conceive 
of the meaning of meaning, both as humans and as researchers. After compiling it, out of 
curiosity, I looked up the entry for ‘meaning’ in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED). 
Interestingly it’s three fold presentation reflects the typology outlined: (i) literal definition; 
(ii) significance; (iii) purpose. 
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The final column in box 1 shows the density of interest IPA has in each level and shows the 
intricate interweaving of the levels. The core concern of IPA is at level 3 ‘what is the 
experiential significance of what is unfolding?’ However an inevitable and intrinsic 
requirement of that endeavor is an engagement with the prior literal and pragmatic 
components of meaning. I need to understand what the person meant when they said 
something in order to understand what this thing means for their life.  
 
And then looking in the other direction, the experiential significance of an event considered 
in an IPA study often slips over into a concern with the significance for the person’s identity. 
And finally sometimes, though not typically in an IPA study, we find that the things 
happening to someone are of such an order that they can lead to a questioning about the 
meaning of life itself. 
 
Having articulated more explicitly IPA’s conception with meaning at a significant experiential 
level, and having positioned it in relation to other forms of meaning, it is now useful to 
elaborate on it by drawing on some other theoretical writing. The following quote from 
Charles Taylor (1985b) encapsulates his definition of what experiential meaning is and this 
resonates very closely with the central concerns of IPA: 
 
 On the phenomenological level or that of ordinary speech (and the two converge for 
the purposes of this argument) a certain notion of meaning has an essential place in 
the characterization of human behavior. This is the sense in which we speak of a 
situation, an action, a demand, a prospect having a certain meaning for a person… 
When we speak of the 'meaning' of a given predicament, we are using a concept 
which has the following articulation. 
(1) Meaning is for a subject: it is not the meaning of the situation in vacuo, but its 
meaning for a subject, a specific subject, a group of subjects…   
(2) Meaning is of something; that is, we can distinguish between a given element- 
situation, action, or whatever- and its meaning. But this is not to say that they are 
physically separable. Rather we are dealing with two descriptions of the element, in 
one of which it is characterized in terms of its meaning for the subject…  
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(3) Things only have meaning in a field, that is, in relation to the meanings of other 
things. This means that there is no such thing as a single, unrelated meaningful 
element; and it means changes in the other meanings in the field can involve changes 
in the given element...                                                                
Meaning in this sense-let us call it experiential meaning- thus is for a subject, of 
something, in a field.  (p21-23) 
 
This is a clear and useful partitioning of the different elements in an experience which make 
it meaningful which can be directly applied to the analysis performed in IPA, as we will see 
later in this paper. The articulation of meaning as being of a particular thing, for a particular 
person, within a particular context also speaks to IPA’s idiographic commitment.  
 
I’d like to link IPA’s conception of experiential meaning to another significant intellectual 
figure: Jerome Bruner. This is especially pertinent given Bruner’s position as one of the 
leading figures in psychology’s turn, in the middle of the 20th Century, from a behaviourist to 
a cognitive paradigm. In 1990 Bruner laments what he saw as cognitive psychology’s rather 
rapid move then from the science of meaning making to the science of information-
processing. Here he eloquently describes what the project was supposed to be and what it 
became: 
 
 It was, we thought, an all-out effort to establish meaning as the central concept of 
psychology- not stimuli and responses, not overtly observable behaviour, not 
biological drives and their transformation, but meaning…  Its aim was to discover and 
to describe formally the meanings that human beings created out of their encounters 
with the world, and then to propose hypotheses about what meaning-making 
processes were implicated. It focused upon the symbolic activities human beings 
employed in constructing and making sense not only of the world, but of themselves… 
The cognitive revolution... became fractionated and technicalized … Emphasis began 
shifting from “meaning” to “information” from the construction of meaning to the 
processing of information. These are profoundly different matters. The key factor in 
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the shift was the introduction of computation as the ruling metaphor and of 
computability as a necessary criterion of a good theoretical model.  (p2-4) 
 
This is a very articulate manifesto and statement of regret. It feels as though there was this 
quite small window for mainstream cognitive psychology where it was engaged in what 
Bruner saw as the new cognitive project of meaning making before it pretty quickly slipped 
into becoming something else. Interestingly then, what IPA is concerned with and what it 
does are consonant with what Bruner saw as the central purpose of cognitive psychology.  
Therefore IPA is, in part, carrying on the legacy of Jerome Bruner’s cognitive psychology- the 
science of meaning and meaning making.  
 
The hermeneutic researcher and the double hermeneutic 
 
So far I have given an extended treatment of what I mean when I say IPA is concerned with 
how participants are engaged in a search for the meaning of their experiences. What is 
already more familiar in the literature of IPA is the way in which researchers are also 
meaning making agents who, in their analysis, are trying, through interpretative 
engagement with the participant, to make sense of the phenomena they’re presented with. 
While this is more familiar terrain, I think it is helpful to go over it again briefly in order to 
see the full picture.  
 
To do this I would like to revisit Heidegger’s outlining of a hermeneutic phenomenology in 
Being and Time (1962). Heidegger stated that the word phenomenology comes from the 
Greek and is actually made up of two components, phenomenon and logos, each of which is 
important. So phenomenon is primarily to do with appearance, with appearing and showing 
whereby something that is previously hidden comes into light:  
 
 It is something that proximally for the most part does not show itself at all; something 
that lies hidden in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show 
itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and 
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belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground.  (Heidegger, 
1962, p59) 
 
So the phenomenon lies hidden. It’s tantalising, it’s underneath but it’s also connected with, 
what is already visible. And there are clues in what is visible to help access the phenomenon 
underneath.  
 
Logos is more analytical, involving reason and sense making. So yes, the thing appears. But 
the phenomenologist helps bring that into play.  It’s the phenomenologist who helps set the 
scene that allows the participant to talk and therefore give us access to the phenomena. 
And then critically, the phenomenologist makes sense of the appearing. And this takes 
Heidegger to hermeneutics as Moran (2000), a leading writer on phenomenology, says:  
 
Phenomenology is seeking after a meaning which is perhaps hidden by the entity’s 
mode of appearing. In that case, the proper model for seeking meaning is the 
interpretation of a text and for this reason Heidegger links phenomenology with 
hermeneutics. How things appear or are covered up must be explicitly studied. (p229) 
 
So for Heidegger and IPA, unlike some other phenomenologies, in order to do the 
phenomenology, you need to do the hermeneutics, you need to do the interpretation. The 
thing is there ready to shine forth, but detective work is needed to enable that to happen. 
And for Heidegger, and IPA therefore, phenomenology is about discovering or uncovering 
meanings. How much digging or uncovering is needed to get at those meanings depends on 
the particular circumstance (Smith, 2011).  
 
Therefore we have seen that participants are attempting to search for the meaning in what 
is happening to them and it is this very meaning making that turns an event into an 
experience. And we can see, in turn, that researchers can be said to be doing a similar thing. 
It is important conceptually therefore to bring these two things together.  
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Martin, Sugarman and Thompson (2003) do this by completing the circle and, aligning with 
Dilthey, in coupling the hermeneutics of the person and the hermeneutics of the researcher:  
 
The phenomena of the human sciences, especially psychological phenomena, not only 
require interpretation in their study… but also are constituted by human interpretive 
practices. (p73) 
 
So, neatly, both the process and the content of human science inquiry are interpretation. 
The researcher is doing interpretation but what they’re doing interpretation of is their 
participants’ interpretive work. And for both, the interpretation is of the experiential 
meaning of the phenomenon under consideration. 
 
I have myself articulated this relationship in a similar but slightly different way, as a double 
hermeneutic (Smith & Osborn, 2003):  
 
The participants are trying to make sense of their world; the researcher is trying to 
make sense of the participants trying to make sense of their world. (p51) 
 
I think that’s helpful because it makes the researcher both like and unlike the participant: 
like because they are doing interpretative work; like because this is a demystification of 
what qualitative experiential analysis is. In one way it’s merely doing what human beings do. 
OK, it’s doing it in more detail, it’s doing it more steadfastly, but none the less, it’s an 
essentially human process that is happening in that research endeavor.  
 
But the researcher is also different from the participant because their interpretation is 
second order. They don’t have direct access to the experience of the participant; rather 
what they’ve got access to is the account from the participant, the participant’s own sense 
making of what’s happening to them.  
 
The central point then is that ordinary human activity and less ordinary human science 
research can be seen as intimately connected. Being human involves seeking after the 
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meaning of significant experiences happening in one’s life. Being an IPA researcher involves 
searching for the meaning in the rich personal accounts about their lives provided by 
participants. 
 
The meaning of pain 
 
I would now like to draw on some of the empirical research I have conducted on the 
experience of chronic pain to illustrate both: 
 The way in which this shows the participants attempting to make sense of, find the 
meaning in, what is happening to them.  
 How the theoretical ideas on meaning can be seen to be manifest in, or resonate 
with, this research on pain. 
 
Pain is in itself a very interesting phenomenon because it’s so difficult to pin down and it’s 
hard to capture in quantitative scales. Within mainstream health research, a biopsychosocial 
model is invoked whereby pain represents the outcome of the meeting of those three 
components. There is, therefore, a recognition by many of the value in detailed qualitative 
experiential studies aiming to get at the meaning of pain. 
 
I’ve been involved in a number of studies in this area. Each has been done with a clinician as 
a co-researcher which means there’s a useful triangulation or dialogue between me as an 
experiential researcher and somebody who’s got clinical experience of the topic. I’m going 
to show a small number of extracts from three studies to show how IPA works with 
meaning.  
 
The first study (Smith & Osborn, 2007) is an examination of the impact of chronic pain on 
self and identity. The participants are in mid-adulthood with chronic low back pain so severe 
that they’re off work. They’re also at the end of the road in terms of medical interventions 
and they’ve stopped pain killers because they don’t really work for them. All participants 
have been referred to a pain clinic but, importantly, they’re interviewed before the 
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intervention. We wanted them to be, as far as possible, raw and naïve to the psychological 
discourse that would happen during the intervention.  
 
Here’s a fairly extended passage from Helen which shows how she is so centrally engaged 
with trying to make sense of her pain:  
 
 It’s not who I am, it’s just who I am if you know what I mean. It’s not really me, I get 
like that and I know like, you’re being mean now but I can’t help it.  It’s the pain, it’s 
me, but it is me, me doing it but not me do you understand what I’m saying?  If I was 
to describe myself like you said, I’m a nice person, but then I’m not am I? And there’s 
other stuff, stuff I haven’t told you, if you knew you’d be disgusted, I just get so 
hateful…  It’s the mean me, my mean head all sour and horrible. I can’t cope with that 
bit, I cope with the pain better. [Tearful] Look do you mind if we stop now, I didn’t 
think it would be like this, I don’t want to talk any more. 
 
This seems a very clear example of the participant attempting to make sense of their 
predicament and stands as a brilliant testament to the way in which participants try to find 
meaning in what is happening to them.  
 
Helen’s attributional wrestle at the beginning is both relational and personal. It is a form of 
dialogical hermeneutics: ‘Do you understand what I’m saying?’ (Or: Do we understand each 
other?) But it seems likely she is also trying to work things out herself: ‘I’m a nice person, 
but then I’m not am I?’ There is a battle between two different selves: the nice person that 
she’s grown up seeing herself as (and still wants to see herself as) and this other self that is 
emerging- the mean and miserable self. And, dramatically, she tells us that we’re only 
seeing the tip of the iceberg. There is other stuff but it is so shameful that she can’t tell us all 
of it.  
 
Finally, this is also a clear piece of hot cognition. It’s not a reported narrative of a concern in 
the past. The sense making is clearly happening now. She is engaged with this problem, 
trying to make sense of it, trying to deal with it now. And as clear marker of the affective 
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cognition that is happening in the here and now, she gets upset and asks for the interview 
to stop. 
 
Lets’ look at Helen’s statement in the light of Taylor’s definition of experiential meaning, 
outlined earlier in the paper. The phenomenon or experience being talked about is clearly 
meaning for a subject. We are not in this passage being told about some abstract or 
generalized sense of pain, we are witnessing this particular person Helen trying to make 
sense of her pain. As we read the passage we are hearing, at one and the same time, the 
content of an attempt at finding meaning and an assertion of the selfhood of the subject 
attempting that meaning making. 
 
Second the meaning is of something. Taylor’s differentiation between an objective element 
and the subjective meaning of that element for the participant is brilliantly captured in 
Helen’s claim that ‘It’s the mean me, my mean head all sour and horrible. I can’t cope with 
that bit, I cope with the pain better’. Yes there is something objectively, medically defined as 
pain but what we are learning about here is the personal significance and impact of the pain 
for Helen and it is that non-biomedical, experiential pain which constitutes its meaning.  
 
Third there is a field in which the meaning of this pain is located. The passage implicitly 
invokes a social realm of other people who are being treated differently by Helen as a result 
of the changes caused by the pain. And the pain engenders both implicated judgements 
from those others and a sense of shame on the part of Helen. 
 
So we can clearly see how this passage works as a powerful warrant for an IPA analysis of 
experiential meaning and how it can be parsed in terms of Taylor’s conceptual components 
of that experiential meaning. 
 
The relational field is fundamental to participants’ experience of the meaning of pain. So we 
see an added layer of significance away from the objective entity. For Helen what is worse 
than the pain was what it is doing to her sense of who she is. In parallel, for participants, 
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having pain on your own is bad but having it within a relational nexus makes it more 
difficult. Kevin introduces the complex nature of this: 
 
This pain, it hurts but its evil gives me a nasty head and makes me hateful, irrational. I 
hate it when they all leave in the morning and I’m left on my own and I hate it when 
they all come back in the evening… If something sad happens to someone, I’m not sad, 
sometimes I’m pleased… I’m just glad someone else is miserable and you have these 
stupid rows about nothing and you know they’re stupid but you have them anyway 
because you get to spray a bit of hate about. 
 
It is a lose-lose situation. When he is on his own, Kevin will be lonely, with no distractions. 
When he is with others, the distraction allows for negative relational affect and cognition. 
And that itself is complicated. On the one hand, being with other people allows some 
catharsis. On the other hand, it makes him feel badly towards others. And the imagery in 
the final sentence speaks clearly to the toxic interpersonal consequence of his pain. He feels 
he is contaminating others with the thing that has invaded him.  
 
And what is the consequence of this process? Kevin continues:  
 
I need to be careful about people and a bit worried about what’s going to happen to 
me. Are we all going to get rounded up and taken to a camp somewhere? 
 
What an extraordinary thing for Kevin to say. What does he mean and why does he think it?  
While he just says camp, it’s pretty clear he doesn’t mean a holiday camp but rather a 
prison camp or a detention camp. So why on earth would he be thinking that? Here’s 
somebody whose pain is so great that you would expect it would invoke compassion, 
empathy on the part of people outside. But Kevin’s worried that actually he’s going to be 
rounded up and punished for having this pain.  
 
Well let’s look at the phenomenological logic. A summary of the story Kevin, like the others, 
presents is: ‘I was a good person, this pain has invaded me, and it’s changing me, and 
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turning me into a bad person. And now as a bad person, I’m contaminating other people. 
And so I am scared that I will be held to account and punished for this’. 
 
Seen this way, Kevin’s concern makes sense. So I think this is a strong illustration of the way 
in which medicine, by concentrating on the physical pain is, to a certain extent, missing the 
point. The psychological impact on the person is potentially greater and this clearly has 
implications for therapeutic interventions.  
 
The strength of Kevin’s plight is enhanced when seen in the light of Taylor’s components of 
experiential meaning. His statement is clearly demonstrating meaning for a subject. The first 
person presentation gives clear personal ownership to the experience. Kevin needs to be 
careful and is concerned about what is going to happen to him. And second, there is a 
strong affective subjective object here which can be distinguished from, but is also 
umbilically tied to, the objective pain object.  
 
I think our analysis of Kevin’s statement also usefully demonstrates the other side of the 
double hermeneutic, illustrating Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenological description of 
the experiential researcher engaged in the search for the latent meaning beyond the 
manifest.  
 
First, here is the manifest, the thing Kevin actually said:  
 
Are we all going to get rounded up and taken to a camp somewhere? 
 
And through a process of hermeneutic phenomenological analysis we get to the latent: 
 
  Are we all going to get rounded up and taken to a prison camp somewhere?  
 
I should note here that I have given an abbreviated set of extracts from participants in order 
to illustrate the theoretical argument being proposed. The original study is much more 
heavily evidenced with material from a number of participants, illustrating the steps in the 
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sequence. And it’s the power of the hermeneutic circle, the scale of the cumulative and 
iterative evidence, picking up other things Kevin’s said, and things other participants said, 
that gives us confidence with our interpretation of Kevin’s statement about the camp. 
 
Next I would like to give an extract from an earlier study (Osborn & Smith 1998) which was a 
broader reconnaissance of the pain experience. I have used this passage in exemplifying the 
analysis of IPA before. Here however I am employing it to make three separate and new 
points in relation to meaning making. I am using the passage to: 
(i) Illustrate further partitioning of experiential meaning, in relation to Taylor’s model; 
(ii) Connect with a reflexive definition of identity; 
(iii) Expand the notion of the hermeneutic circle of inquiry. 
 
Talking about the impact of pain on her, Linda says:  
 
 I’m only 50 and I should be doing this and that and the other cos they say life begins 
at 40 but I can’t and I suppose it does bother me. It’s frustrating that people of my 
own age, you can see them flying their kite and you feel as if you can’t, which is so 
stupid, I just think I’m the fittest because there are 3 girls (she and her sisters) and I’m 
the middle one and I thought well I’m the fittest and I used to work like a horse and I 
thought I was the strongest and then all of a sudden it’s just been cut down and I can’t 
do half of what I used to do. 
 
So what’s going on here? As part of making sense of her predicament and her pain, Linda 
engages in a comparison with a whole set of others: 
  An ought self, manifesting what she should be doing; 
 What other people she meets are actually doing;  
 What members of her family are doing;  
 What she was doing in the past. 
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And the stark thing is, that on all comparisons, she’s failing. As a reflection of how 
contracted and reduced her current life/self is, she is comparing herself with each of these 
other lives/selves and she is failing in comparison to them all.  
 
It is also useful to look at Linda’s account in terms of Taylor’s three components of 
phenomenological meaning. First, again, we are under no illusion that Linda is talking about 
her particular experience- the meaning of pain to her. Second, quite separate from, but 
equally connected to a physical pain, is the psychological, relational and temporal 
experience of the pain for her. So, finally, the meaning of experiential pain exists in a field, a 
social nexus of surveillance, of other people: imagined, familial, remembered.  
 
Let’s look at the temporal dimension a little further. Linda begins in the present by saying: ‘I 
just think I’m the fittest’. And then she slips to somewhere between the present and the 
past: ‘I thought well I’m the fittest’. And then there is a more clearly past tense: ‘I thought I 
was the strongest’. So she appears at one and the same time to be saying: 
  I am the fittest 
  I used to be the fittest and strongest  
 Now I am the weakest 
 
So what’s going on? If you tried to capture that in a single rating scale, it would be very 
difficult because there’s a contradiction. How can she be, at one and the same time, the 
strongest and the weakest? In fact, we would say that actually goes to the heart of the 
matter because where is the real Linda located? We would suggest that what this passage 
illustrates is Linda’s attempt to hang on to a familiar self at the same time as she realizes it is 
threatened, under attack. 
 
So while an objective assessment would point to a diminished physical self as a result of the 
pain, we would posit that if asked where her real self is located, Linda might well say it is in 
the super strong person she remembers from the past. She might say ‘that is the real me, 
right there’. She’s not denying the actual decline but one way of preserving herself against 
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the difficulties that she’s facing is to remember an exaggerated positive form of the self in 
the past. And I think that connects quite neatly to Anthony Giddens’ (1991) 
conceptualization of identity:  
 
Self-identity is not a distinctive trait, or even a collection of traits, possessed by the 
individual. It is the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his 
biography. Identity here still presumes continuity across time and space: but self-
identity is such continuity as interpreted reflexively by the agent. (p53-4)  
 
So biography is not an objective, detached record of the life. Rather it is the life as 
constructed by the person in the present. It is particularly pertinent for Linda to  
emphasise the continuity of herself between the present and the past because in so doing 
she is helping to preserve her sense of self against the ravages of the pain.  
 
This paper also for the first time allows us to engage in a more historical hermeneutic circle. 
The two studies we have looked at were conducted and reported separately at different 
times and when we bring them together we can see how they first and foremost offer their 
distinct and particular accounts of the experience of each group of participants. But then we 
have the added advantage of being able to look at the two together and we find they offer 
mutual illumination of each other and the analysis of each helps strengthen the basis of the 
analysis of the other.  
 
So we can see that in both cases the participants, under the onslaught of pain, are striving 
to hang onto an original virtuous self. In each case, we bear witness to that ongoing battle 
for the self: a good me versus a not good me; pain as me versus pain as not me. Of course 
the analysis recognizes the particularity of the predicament for each participant as each 
person has their own personal position in relation to that battle. But it then also allows us to 
see convergence as well as idiosyncrasy. And indeed the convergence with what we find in 
the first study presented above can give us even more conviction in the validity of our 
interpretation of Linda attempting to preserve the mental record of the superhuman self of 
the past as a resource to help deal with the physical degradation being faced now.  
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Painting pain 
 
I would now like to draw on one final study (Kirkham, Smith & Havsteen-Franklin, 2015). 
This study is concerned with the experiences of a similar set of patients with pain but it has 
an added component. At the beginning of each interview, the participant was given 
coloured pencils and asked to draw a picture of their pain. The drawing then acted as a 
stimulus for the interview. The participant talked about their picture and more generally 
about their experience. And the analysis was of the picture, of the patients’ talk about the 
picture and then of the other things they said in the interview.  
 
The pictures are extraordinary and offer quite a lot of eerie similarity. So we see a set of 
pictures of lurid, dangerous, destructive things: swirling dervishes, viruses going through the 
body, saws swinging around and cutting through the body’s flesh (See Figure 1).  
 
 
                                                   Figure 1: Pictures of pain 
 
In this paper I’m just going to talk about one person’s drawing. Here is Zoe talking about her 
drawing (the right hand one in figure 1): 
 
It’s like rubber but with really sharp spikes on it and that’s how I see it. It feels 
like that, it’s like my eyeballs exploding, like you want to do that (she pulls at 
eye socket). 
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It’s very graphic, it’s very real, and part of what’s compelling about it is this ambiguous or 
paradoxical combination of soft tissue, the roundness, and then the spikes. We can almost 
see the eyeball and the way that the spikes are then cutting through the tissue around the 
eye. The picture captures it brilliantly.  
 
But part of the power of the image is how it leads Zoe into providing an extended homily on 
her pain: 
 
I’ve got different pains…The guillotine is normally right across but from the 
back, through my chest, through the top of my lungs and it feels like a sharp 
blade right across me. I get that all the time…I’ve got the scaffolding pole 
which goes through the top of my head and feels like it comes out here 
somewhere… It feels like I’ve got a massive chain round my neck with a big 
gold brass ball where the chain goes round but the ball’s so big it’s right there 
on the back of my neck…heavy and it hurts. 
 
Zoe’s body is violated by an array of macabre barbaric instruments of punishment 
and torture: the guillotine bisects her lungs; the scaffolding pole plunges through 
the top of her head etc. The pictorial presentation of pain helps bring forth an 
equally graphic symbolic portrait of the meaning of pain to Zoe. Not surprisingly, 
such a distressing imaginary dwelling leads Zoe to search for an explanation:  
 
It’s dark, it’s almost, it’s punishment, it’s torture…Sometimes it feels that I 
must have done something wrong, not necessarily in this life. 
 
People search after meaning. If the experience of pain is so punitive, what can possibly 
explain it? Assuming that in some way she is being punished for something she has done, 
and finding no satisfactory cause in this life, the scale of the ensuing punishment pushes Zoe 
to consider attributing that wrong doing to something she did in a previous life. 
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Finally this passage adds another piece to the unfolding jigsaw. We have already seen a 
presentation of the possibility of pain leading to severe punishment, in the thoughts of 
Kevin. Here with Zoe we see pain manifesting as the punishment itself. So pain can lead to 
punishment but it can also itself be punishment.  
 
Unhomelikeness 
 
Here I would like to make a connection with one final source. Svenaeus (2010), from a 
Heideggerian perspective, describes illness in the following way:  
 
 Illness is an unhomelike being-in-the-world in which the embodied ways of 
being-in of the self (person) have been thwarted. In illness the body shows up 
as an alien being (being me, yet not me) and this obstruction attunes the 
entire being-in-the-world of the ill person in an unhomelike way. (p337) 
 
This is a beautiful account of illness and the connections between Svenaeus’ account and 
the unfolding argument of this paper are almost uncanny. Svenaeus considers the normal 
human state is a feeling of being at home and that this is disrupted in illness by what seems 
like an alien being. Well, we have seen various graphic depictions of that alien being in our 
participants’ pictorial and linguistic representations: the spikey ball intruding in Zoe’s body, 
the venomous spray emanating from Kevin.  
 
Svenaeus points to a battle between being me and yet not me. And that is close to the very 
words that Helen used to convey what pain was doing to her: ‘it’s me, it’s not me, do you 
understand what I mean?’ And we can also connect it to our presentation of Linda’s 
conception of where the real me is located, as she might have said, ‘this current weak me- it 
is me and it’s not me’. 
 
Finally, Svenaeus argues that illness changes the person’s experience from a feeling of being 
at home in the world to a feeling of being unsettled and unhomelike. Well remember what 
Kevin said about his fears of being taken away. Because Kevin is unsettled by the pain, this 
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can indeed be said to be, in Svenaeus’ terminology, an unhomelike experience. What could 
be a more dramatic marking of that psychological or experiential unsettledness than for 
Kevin to be literally unsettled, removed from his home and put in an unhomelike place, a 
prison camp? I think Kevin’s depiction of his fearful concern represents a very powerful 
symbolic illustration of Svenaeus’ notion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Hopefully, in this paper you’ve seen the way in which we’ve witnessed the participants’ 
attempts to make sense of the meaning of their pain: witnessing, as in Helen’s extract, their 
real-time struggle and discomfort; witnessing, as in Zoe’s case study, the attempt to 
represent the pain through their drawings; witnessing as in all the cases, our subsequent 
attempts through the analysis process to make sense of their words and their lives.  
 
What comes out of this witnessing is the recognition that pain is much more than a 
biomedical phenomenon. Pain is experienced as malevolent, punishing and shameful and as 
having seriously deleterious impact on the person’s sense of self. 
 
So I would say IPA helps us get close to personal experience of these elusive phenomena, in 
this case pain. I hope you’ve seen how its distinctive idiographic, micro-textural focus works, 
and also got a sense of the way we’re engaged with trying to capture something of the hot 
cognition involved in making sense of experience. 
 
I have also linked the graphic illustrations to a range of theoretical ideas on hermeneutics 
and meaning making.  Drawing on a range of writers, I have fleshed out IPA’s conception of 
the double hermeneutic where both participant and researcher are engaged in searching for 
meaning- the participant in what is happening to them, the researcher in the participant’s 
account of what is happening to them. 
 
Further I have attempted to demonstrate explicitly how features of the analytic extracts 
presented can also be seen to be illustrating elements of the theoretical conceptions 
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offered by some of the writers, in particular Heidegger, Taylor, Giddens and Svenaeus. I 
hope thereby to have illustrated a close meshing of theoretical and empirical instantiation 
of the search for experiential meaning. 
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